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1.-Introduction 
Many economists and other analysts have pointed out that Milton Friedman’s remarks on 
the necessity of an expansive monetary policy in Japan after its 1991 financial crisis, is a 
prima facie evidence that he would have supported the Quantitative Easing (QE) schemes 
implemented by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and other major central banks since the 2008 
financial crisis. This unqualified extrapolation of Friedman’s comments to the QE programs 
put in practice since 2008, however, ignores completely the monetary policy framework 
that Friedman developed specially during the sixties. In contrast to the loosely supported 
connections between Friedman’s ideas and the 2008-2014 QE programs, Nelson (2011) and 
Bernanke (2012) argue formally that Friedman’s monetarist portfolio balance theory 
provides a solid theoretical link between its monetary framework and the most recent QE 
operations developed by the Fed and other major central banks.    
This paper argues that the theoretical origin of QE programs as a general concept clearly 
links to Friedman’s (and monetarist) ideas, but that the specific implementation of QE 
operations to cope with the 2008 financial crisis does not comply with key principles 
developed by Friedman. Based on Friedman’s work, I contend that his monetary framework 
links to QE through what he (and Anna Schwartz) called the “monetary” effects of monetary 
policy and not the portfolio balance effect highlighted by Nelson (2011) and Bernanke 
(2012). The “monetary” effects should consider Friedman’s concern with the use of 
monetary policy as an important tool for the stabilization of the economy.  The “monetary” 
effects emphasizes the capacity of monetary policy of providing enough high-powered 
money to maintain M2 growing during periods of financial distress at rates similar to those 
registered in “normal” times. In contrast, the portfolio balance effect focuses on the 
capacity of monetary policy to affect the structure of interest rates. 
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The combination of the “monetary” effects with the stabilizing role of monetary policy 
should produce QE programs with a path of the monetary base (central bank assets) and M2 
very different to what we have seen under the 2008-2014 QE programs based on the 
portfolio balance effect.   
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 discuss  briefly the role of monetary 
policy based on large expansions of the monetary base (central bank assets) in the currently 
dominant schools of thought, New Classical and New Keynesian; Section 4 revises some of 
Friedman’s and other monetarist economists ideas that provide a theoretical support for 
Quantitative Easing; Section 5 uses the elements supplied  by section 4 to analyze the QE 
programs put in place by the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of England (BOE), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) after 2008, and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) after 2001; Section 6 
presents some concluding remarks. 
2.-New Classical economics and QE 
New Classical (NC) economics have developed several neutrality propositions whose central 
theme is that economic agents are basically indifferent among the financial instruments 
they could employ to finance their operations. Wallace (1981) extends the Modigliani – 
Miller theorem (1958) to open market operations. The Wallace-Modigliani-Miller (W-M-M) 
theorem states that open market operations between money and another asset, with 
government consumption held constant, will not exert any real effects, or even change the 
price level (Handa, 2009).   
The W-M-M theorem is developed in the context of an overlapping generations model in 
which two assets, money and a stored commodity are used as to transfer purchasing power 
from period t  to 1t  . To ensure a positive demand for money, it is assumed that the stored 
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commodity has a stochastic gross return that just compensates the risk anticipated by a risk-
averse individual. A government’s open market purchase is represented as the exchange of 
tdk of the stored commodity against tdm of money balances. Since the open market 
operations do not alter the budget constraints of the old or the young, neither their utility 
functions, the optimal paths of consumption and saving are unchanged. In the money 
market, money demand increases by the amount  
tdm  equivalent to the increase in the 
money supply, so that the price level will also not be affected by the open market 
operations.  
To adapt the W-M-M theorem to an economy with bonds, we can introduce a central bank 
that issues fiat money and bonds and puts these liabilities into circulation by purchasing 
commodities which it stores (Handa, 2009). It is assumed that the central bank uses the 
return obtained from the stored commodities to pay interests on bonds. As in the previous 
case if the stochastic gross return on the stored commodity (bonds) just compensates the 
risk assumed by a risk-averse individual, there will be a positive demand for money. Since 
fiat money and bonds are equivalent in terms of being a medium of saving with the same 
expected return, the public will be indifferent between them. The aggregate demand for 
money and bonds relative to their aggregate supply will determine the price level. The 
composition of this aggregate, however, is irrelevant in the determination of the price level. 
Therefore, an open market operation between fiat money and bonds would have no effect 
on the price level and on real variables. 
Also in the vein of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, Williamson (2014) points out that modern 
theory of banking and financial economics consider that financial assets are malleable 
objects. In contrast with goods and services, financial assets can be transformed in various 
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ways by banks and other financial intermediaries. “For example, a bank can transform long-
maturity, risky, and illiquid assets into short-maturity, safe, and liquid liabilities which are 
then held in the private sector.”  From this perspective, QE operations may have little 
impact in a liquidity trap.     
Thus, it is not surprising that New Classical economists will put little faith in the capacity of 
QE schemes to have any meaningful effect on economic performance, at least if they 
believe that the aseptic conditions under which their theories are derived provide a good 
approximation to the real world. 
3.-New Keynesian economics and QE 
The standard New Keynesian (NK) model is composed of an IS equation, an expectations-
augmented Phillips equation, and a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Woodford (2007) argues 
that this model is consistent with a world in which there is no special role for money in 
facilitating transactions, and hence, money is perfectly substitutable for any other nominal 
asset of similar risk. According to Woodford, the derivation of the standard model without 
frictions is a way to clarify that its basic relationships do not have an intrinsic connection 
with the evolution of the money supply. Woodford, however, holds that the model does not 
require assuming that open market operations are irrelevant, or that there is not a uniquely 
defined trajectory for the money supply associated to the policy rule. The model is still 
consistent with a well-defined demand for money function which gives rise to an 
equilibrium in the money market. But this additional equation is not necessary for the 
model to determine the evolution of inflation, the price level, output, and the interest rates 
under a given interest rate rule. 
5 
 
In addition, there is the zero lower bound problem associated with monetary policy 
conducted with an interest rate instrument. As discussed in Walsh (2010),  Benhabib, 
Schmit-Grohé and Uribe (2001a, 2001b, 2002) and  Schmit-Grohé and Uribe (2000)  hold 
that simple and reasonable monetary policy rules that follow the Taylor principle changing 
the nominal interest rate more than proportionally in response to changes in inflation, could 
generate macroeconomic instability that would drive the economy toward a liquidity trap. 
In this context, there is a stationary equilibrium with the inflation rate equal to * (the 
inflation target of the central bank). For inflation rates that start below * , however, the 
inflation rate decreases. Absent a zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate,  , 
but this trajectory should be discarded as it violates a transversality condition necessary for 
the optimizing behavior of the representative agent. If the deflation rate is bounded from 
below, because the nominal interest rate cannot be less than zero, the economy converges 
to a liquidity trap with a nominal interest rate equal to zero and a stable deflation rate ** 1    
There have been several proposals to deal with the zero lower bound problem in the 
context of the NK model. Taylor and Williams (2010) point out that the zero lower bound of 
the nominal interest rate has implications for the settings of the parameters in the interest 
rate rule. For example, Reifschneider and Williams (Taylor and Williams, 2010) find that an 
increase in the response to the output gap in the interest rate rule helps to reduce the 
effects of the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate. Taylor and Williams (2010) 
point out, however, that this approach can increase the variability of inflation and the 
interest rate. Additionally, a general result from the literature is that the optimal coefficient 
of the output gap in the policy rule declines in the presence of measurement errors in the 
                                                          
1
 See Walsh (2010) and Olivo (2011) for more details. 
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gap. Given the limitations of the approach of responding more aggressively to the output 
gap, Reifschneider and Williams (Taylor and Williams, 2010) suggest other modifications to 
the policy rule. One of the proposals consists in reducing the interest rate more aggressively 
than normal in the vicinity of a liquidity trap. This approach, however, is based on an 
atypical behavior of the central bank when is confronted with the zero lower bound, and 
this could confuse economic agents and, in turn, generate unforeseen consequences.  An 
alternative approach promoted by Eggertsson and Woodford (Taylor and Williams, 2010) is 
to adopt an explicit price level target instead of an inflation target when the economy 
approaches a liquidity trap. A price level target promises a stronger monetary stimulus and 
more inflation in the future than an interest rule with an inflation target. On the other hand, 
a liquidity trap provides an argument to use a higher inflation target than the one that 
would be used absent this restriction. Taylor and Williams (2010) hold that if the target 
inflation rate is sufficiently high, the liquidity trap will rarely affect monetary policy and the 
macro economy.  
The previous discussion suggests that open market operations and monetary base 
expansions are not, at least directly and explicitly, in the range of options considered by 
New Keynesian economists to deal with the zero lower bound problem.    
4.-Friedman, Monetarism and QE 
Friedman (1960) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963b) have argued cogently that the 
reduction in the quantity of money by a third from 1929 to 1933 made the depression much 
longer and more severe. In a Program for Monetary Stability (1960), Friedman states: 
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“All told, from July 1929 to March 1933, the money stock fell by over a third, with over two-
thirds of the decline coming after England’s departure from the gold standard and the 
accompanying deflationary action by the system. 
I have described this episode in some detail because it has played such an important role in 
forming –or should I say deforming– opinions about monetary policy. It was interpreted to 
mean that monetary policy is an ineffective instrument for stemming deflation. In fact it is a 
tragic testament to the harm that inappropiate policy can do. It may well be that a different 
policy might not have prevented a severe contraction; it certainly could have made it much 
less severe that it was and could have prevented the collapse of the banking system. It is 
noteworthy that every country that followed Britain in going off gold experience revival in 
1931 or shortly thereafter; every country that followed the U.S. in accepting monetary 
deflation saw the contraction drag on to 1933 or later.”   
In the Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Friedman and Schwartz (1963b) 
characterize the monetary policy during the critical period 1929 – 1933 as “inept”.  In fact, 
the following paragraph of the book is very illuminating on the intellectual atmosphere 
outside and inside the Fed during that time:  
“One can read through the annual Proceedings of the American Economic Association or of 
the Academy of Political Science and find only an occasional sign that the academic world 
even knew about the unprecedented banking collapse in process, let alone that it understood 
the cause and the remedy. 
That climate of intellectual opinion helps to explain why the behavior of the Federal Reserve 
System from 1929 to 1933 was not checked or reversed by vigorous and informed outside 
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criticism. But neither the climate of opinion nor external financial pressures nor lack of power 
explains why the Federal Reserve System acted as it did. “  
After 1933, Friedman (1960) points out that the Fed followed “a policy of almost complete 
inactivity.” Friedman attributes this to a defensive reaction to the failure to counteract the 
contraction during the critical years, and to the shift in the intellectual climate of opinion 
which assigned the main countercyclical role to fiscal policy.  
In fact, as many economists have pointed out, Friedman made several explicit assertions 
before passing away about the active role that monetary policy should play during financial 
crisis. For example, in his 1996 interview with Snowdon and Vane (2005), Friedman makes 
the following statements: 
“Take Japan right now. They are wasting their time and money in trying to have an 
expansive fiscal policy without an expansive monetary policy.” 
“It is a very interesting phenomenon because the behavior of the Japanese central bank in 
the past five years duplicates the behavior of the Federal Reserve after 1929.” 
In a very frequently cited interview with David Laidler in 2000, Friedman touched upon 
again on the case of Japan, insisting in the necessity to go beyond low interest rate and 
expanding vigorously the money supply.  
However, these clear statements of Friedman in favor of an active monetary policy during 
periods of financial turmoil should be balanced against other arguments advanced in 
connection to the role of money and monetary policy in the economy. They cannot be 
extrapolated as an unqualified support to the kind of QE operations implemented after 2008 
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by the FED and other central banks. In The Role of Monetary Policy, Friedman (1967) also 
makes the following interesting assertions: 
“Experience suggests that the path of wisdom is to use monetary policy explicitly to offset 
other disturbances only when they offer a “clear and present danger.” 
“The first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can 
do – and it is a lesson of the most profound importance – is that monetary policy can prevent 
money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance.” 
These statements from Friedman are in line with Nelson’s (2011) interpretation that by 
stabilizing and enhancing the money stock, monetary policy could limit the damage that 
credit market disturbances could inflict to the economy. The stabilization of the money 
stock, however, is a secondary issue in Nelson’s (2011) paper.  
Nelson’s (2011) and Bernanke’s (2012) core argument in favor of the idea that QE programs 
after 2008 have followed Friedman’s guidelines is based on the monetarist portfolio balance 
effect. Nelson (2011) focuses on the short-run non-neutrality of monetary policy in general, 
and open market operations in particular.  Such non-neutrality follows from a transmission 
mechanism that relies on a wide-spectrum portfolio effect. This is a point extremely 
important in Friedman’s analysis and for Monetarist economists in general. Monetarists 
hold that money is a close substitute of an ample variety of assets: bonds, equities, physical 
assets, durable and semi-durable goods (see Friedman and Schwartz Money and Business 
Cycles, 1963a).  
I claim, however, that Friedman’s main argument in favor of QE operations during a period 
of financial turmoil does not rest on his belief in the portfolio balance effect, but in what he 
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(and Anna Schwartz) called the “monetary” effects of monetary policy. Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963b) in their discussion about the impact of the “bills only” doctrine on the 
open market operations, argue that from the point of view of the Federal Reserve action on 
the stock of money what really counts is the amount of high-powered money created, which 
is determined by the size of open market operations, not by the kind of securities 
exchanged. Here Friedman and Schwartz (1963) highlight the crucial distinction between the 
“monetary” effects of monetary policy from the “credit” effects:  
“If the bills only policy has nonetheless aroused considerable controversy, it is largely 
because of the tendency we have noted on the part of economists and others to emphasize 
the “credit” effects of monetary policy rather than the “monetary” effects, which is to say, 
the effects on the structure of interest rates rather than on the stock of money. The major 
criticism levied against the bills only policy was that the System was denying itself an 
instrument, considered potent by the critics, for affecting economic activity, namely, 
affecting the relative yields on long- and short-term securities.” 
Nelson (2011) enters into some detail in Friedman’s conception of the portfolio effect of a 
money increase to explain why, his original view of open market operations as exchanges 
between money and short-term debt, could be extended to allow for the possibility of 
operations in long-term government debt.  
Other Monetarists as Meltzer (2001), however, have been more explicit in explaining how 
open market operations in assets different to Treasury bills could work to avoid a liquidity 
trap: 
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“The liquidity trap, by assumption, makes short-term Treasury bills (or similar securities) a 
perfect substitute for base money or bank reserves. Exchanging one for the other does 
nothing of interest. Exchanging either money or Treasury bills for some other asset such as 
foreign money, domestic or foreign long-term bonds, equities, or commodities changes 
relative prices and real wealth. In this hypothetical case, base money plus bills is a composite 
good. The composite good is a gross substitute for other assets; increasing either 
component, or both, is expansive.  
For a full liquidity trap to be effective, the composite asset – money plus bills – must be a 
perfect substitute for all other assets. When the marginal rate of substitution of money for 
bonds goes to zero, all marginal rates of substitution must go to zero. All assets are part of a 
single composite good. 
If assets other than bills and money remain gross substitutes, a liquidity trap means only 
that one row and one column in the matrix of marginal rates of substitution has been 
eliminated. All other marginal rates of substitution remain. Monetary policy remains 
effective. The standard class of models gives the wrong answer about policy. It implies that a 
liquidity trap is possible and, for some, is a reality, (Krugman, 1988, Ito, 1998). The 
alternative denies that a liquidity trap is possible except in the limit when all prices are zero.”      
Here I contend that, though Friedman did not directly address the issue of using open 
market operations in long-term bonds during periods of financial market distress, he was 
not explicitly opposed to this kind of operations. In A Program for Monetary Stability 
Friedman (1960) comments on the “bills only” policy adopted by the Open Market 
Committee of the Reserve System in 1953.  He considers it, in principle: 
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“a device for allocating responsibility among different government agencies and imposes 
hardly any limits whatsoever upon the monetary actions that the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury together can undertake.”  
Some paragraphs below, he further expresses the following:  
“Let us suppose that is desired to add high-powered money by reducing the amount of long-
term securities in the hands of the public. In the absence of the “bills only” policy, the Federal 
Reserve could do this itself simply by buying long-term securities. Given the “bills only” 
policy, the same result can be accomplished by cooperation between the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury.”  
Thus, it is highly possible that in an environment of short-run interest rates close to zero, 
Friedman would have recognized that outright purchases of long-term securities could be a 
more effective mean to achieve the “monetary” effect than the traditional open market 
operations through the purchase of short-term Treasury bills.      
From the previous discussion, there is little room for doubt that Friedman would have 
supported some kind of QE scheme to face the major disturbances that the US and other 
developed countries economies have been experiencing since 2008, or Japan after its 1991 
financial crisis. This statement could reasonably be extended to those economists that still 
follow Monetarists ideas. But Friedman’s view about the usefulness of an expansive 
monetary policy during financial crisis does not rest on the portfolio balance effect, though 
he certainly believed in the relevance of this transmission channel.  
Therefore, an important question is how these monetary policy interventions should be 
designed and implemented in order to comply with Friedman’s standards. I argue that those 
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standards are grounded in the “monetary” effects and the idea that monetary policy should 
aim to be a stabilizing force. The emphasis in the stabilization properties of monetary policy 
may explain why Friedman was less concerned with the composition of the open market 
operations and their potential “credit” effects, than with their influence on the overall 
quantity of high-powered money (the “monetary” effects). Thus a QE scheme based on 
Friedman’s views should principally aim to provide sufficient high-powered money to 
guarantee a stable growth of a broader monetary aggregate such as M2, at annual rates 
similar to those observed in “normal” times. In order to achieve this, the emphasis should 
be placed on the “monetary” effects of monetary policy and not on its “credit” effects, 
which by the way are subjected to long and variable lags (Friedman, 1961).  
From an operational point of view, the central bank should rely exclusively on open market 
operations through outright purchases of financial assets. Open market operations should 
be conducted mainly through purchases of long-term securities that are more effective than 
operations in short-term securities to expand high-powered money in an environment of 
near zero short-run interest rates.  Open market operations via outright purchases should 
provide the means to increase the monetary base at rates significantly higher than those 
observed at “normal” times but, in a way that these increases can be sustained for a 
relatively long period. Repeated cycles of sudden and enormous increases in the rate of 
growth of the monetary base (central bank assets) that can only be maintained for short 
periods and are followed by sharp reductions or even negative rates, will cause vast 
volatility that opposes to the basic idea of promoting stability. 
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5.- Evaluation of Quantitative Easing experiences from Friedman’s perspective 
This section examines the QE experiences of the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Eurozone, and Japan, from what I claim would have been Friedman’s perspective. The paper 
employs monthly data of the monetary base (or central bank assets) and M2, in levels and 
year to year (yty) percentage changes. I try to use relatively long series of more than thirty 
years, when possible, in order to assess the magnitude of the QE operations in a historical 
dimension. The paper also examines the volatility of the relevant time series by using 12-
month moving standard errors of the year to year percentage changes (12MMSE).  
As pointed by Fawley and Neely (2013)2, QE programs in response to financial crisis should 
be distinguished from temporary increases in the monetary base that are occasionally used 
to provide liquidity for short-periods. In general, a QE program can be defined as a 
deliberate attempt of the central bank to increase the monetary base (or alternatively its 
stock of assets) at a rate substantially higher than that observed during “normal” times, for 
a relatively long period of time (six months or more).  
The central bank can increase high-powered money (its stock of assets) through open 
market operations and lowering the interest rate of its lending programs. But some 
qualitative measures, as extending the maturity of the lending programs or the variety of 
assets accepted as collateral, can also have a quantitative impact on the monetary 
base/central bank assets. Thus, qualitative measures can be considered as part of a general 
definition of QE programs. As was discussed in the previous section, however, a QE program 
                                                          
2
 This paper contains one of the best descriptions and chronology of the QE programs of the countries 
analyzed in the paper for the period 2008-2012. 
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that accords to Friedman’s views should be based almost exclusively on outright purchases 
of short-run and long-run securities.  
a) QE in the United States  
Analysis of QE in the United States is based on monthly data of the Monetary Base and M2 
for the period 1959.01 – 2014.12. The data was obtained from the St. Louis’ FRED data base.  
In the US the first stage of QE operations was introduced between October 2008 – May 
2009 in response to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Fawley and Neely, 2013). Between 
mid-2007, when the first signs of the financial crisis appeared and the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, the Fed concentrated in lowering the Federal Funds rate. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the monetary base in levels and growth rates yty from 
1960.01 until 2014.12. In the first eight months of 2008, the monetary base grew mostly 
below 2 % on a yty basis (Figure 1). In September 2008 the pace accelerated to 9.94 %, 
37.08% in October, 72.87 % in November, and 99.04 % in December. The peak in the yty 
growth of the monetary base was reached in May 2009 (112.67 %), and then it started to 
decrease unevenly showing negative values in November and December 2010.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Although QE2 was officially announced in November 2010, the monetary base only began to 
grow significantly again since March 2011 (15.18 % yty), stabilizing over 30 % (yty) between 
June 2011 – November 2011. In December 2011, it started to fall rapidly until reaching 
negative values for the period June 2012 – October 2012.   
QE3 was announced in September 2012, but high-powered money only grew above 10 % 
(yty) again since March 2013. From that moment on the rate of growth of the monetary 
base accelerated gradually until reaching a peak in November 2013 (39.21 %). Then, it began 
to fall gradually until growing below 10 % in the last two months of 2014.    
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This strong but uneven growth in the monetary base is reflected in a drastic increase in its 
volatility as shown in Figure 2. From 1960.11 to 2008.09, the maximum value attained by 
the 12-month moving standard error (12MMSE) of the yty percentage changes was 4.17. 
This value jumped to 10.35 in October 2008, and reached its peak value of 47.27 in April 
2009. The 12MMSE falls to 13.25 in October 2009, and then starts to climb up again up to 
38.88 in April 2010. The ups and downs continue until the end of 2014, with smaller peaks: 
September 2011, 15.29; August 2012, 15.14; November 2013, 13.09. 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
The data for M2 in levels and yty percentage changes for the period 1960.01 – 2014.12 is 
shown in Figure 3. During 2007, when the first signs of the financial crisis appeared and 
September 2008 just before QE1 kicked off, M2 was growing between 5.5 % and 7 % yty. 
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Beginning in October 2008, M2 growth accelerated above 7 % yty, and kept growing well 
above that level (close to 10 %) until June 2009.Starting in July 2009, the yty rate of growth 
of M2 started to slow down substantially, reaching values below 2 % during the period 
2010.03 – 2010.07. M2 continued growing less than 5 % yty until March 2011.  The pace of 
M2 picked up again in April 2011, growing close to 10 % yty between 2011.08 and 2012.06. 
From 2012.07 until 2013.05 M2 expanded, most of the time, above 7 % yty. From 2013.06 
until 2014.12 M2 grew below 7 % yty. 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 graphs the 12 month moving standard errors of yty percentage changes of M2. 
Many of the values observed for this volatility indicator after QE1 are among the highest in 
the complete sample (1960.01 – 2014.12). Of the 77 observations of the 12MMSE since QE1 
(2008.10), 16 observations were above 2.    
Thus, the Fed QE programs were able to avoid a fall in the level of M2 after 2008 as pointed 
by Nelson (2011), but they did not maintain its rate of growth, which in fact fell drastically 
during part of the implementation of QE, and increased substantially its volatility to levels 
only observed during the seventies.  It seems that part of the extreme volatility of the 
monetary base was transmitted to the broader aggregate.  
Figure 4 
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b) QE in the United Kingdom 
The analysis of QE operations in the UK uses data for a hybrid series of the monetary base 
(M0) and the Bank of England (BOE) assets from 1969.06 to 2013.12. The MO series that 
starts in June 1969 was discontinued in April 2006. From May 2006, the BOE began to 
publish a series of its monthly assets that also was discontinued in September 2014. The 
series for M2 is available from 1982.07 to 2013.12. All information was obtained from the 
Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED) database.  
QE programs in the UK began formally in March 2009. Purchases of private assets 
announced and conducted in January 2009, were offset by selling short-term assets (Fawley 
and Neely, 2013). The BOE figures, however, indicate that a substantial expansion of its total 
assets began several months before the official announcements. As shown in Figure 5, the 
yty rate of growth of M0 was generally below 10% since the beginning of the 80s until the 
data was discontinued in April 2006. The yty rate of growth of BOE assets was negative in 
May, June and July of 2007, and expanded just 1.66% in August. But in September 2007, 
there was an important jump in the BOE total assets, that started to grow (yty) between 
12% and 25% until August 2008. Then, the yty rate of growth of the BOE assets jumped to 
40.38% in September 2008 and to its maximum value of 187.89% in October 2008. BOE total 
assets continued growing above 100% on a yty basis until January 2009, slowdown to 
around 80% in 2009.02 – 2009.03 and then accelerated again above 100% from 2009.04 – 
2009.08. Since September 2009, BOE assets exhibited a marked but erratic deceleration up 
to October 2011. In September 2011, coinciding with official announcements to extend QE 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013), the BOE started a new round of expansion of its balance sheet. 
BOE total assets began to grow at double digits rates (yty) in November 2011, reaching 
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progressively a peak of 64.38% in September 2012. In October 2012 started a fairly gradual 
reduction in the yty rate of growth of the BOE assets, until reaching negative values 
between 2013.10 – 2013.12.      
Figure 5 
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September 2010, and continued until December 2011. In January 2012, the 12MMSE 
indicator of the BOE assets started to climb up again reaching a peak of 21.08 in June 2012. 
Double digit values of the 12MMSE were observed until the end of the sample period 
(2013.12). 
Figure 6 
  
Figure 7 shows the evolution, in levels and yty growth rates of M2, for the period 1982.07 – 
2013.12. Between 2001.01 and 2006.12, M2 was growing fairly steadily in the range of 7 - 
10% yty. It decelerated below 7% for the period 2007.01 – 2007.11, and then returns to 
rates over 7% during 2007.12 – 2008.08. But in September 2008, M2 started to decrease its 
pace gradually, reaching a low value of 1.9% yty in April 2009. From then on, it recovers 
slowly, but keeping yty growth rates that barely surpassed 5% between 2010.02 – 2010.04. 
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From May 2010 until August 2011, M2 was growing on a yty basis below 5%.  Beginning in 
September 2012, M2 resumed its growth around 5-6% until November 2013, falling to 
4.55% in 2013.12. Thus after September 2008 until the end of 2013, M2 never recovered its 
yty rate of growth above 7% observed in the first six years of the current century. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 8 shows that the reduction in the rate of growth (yty) of M2 observed after 
September 2008 until December 2013.12, was accompanied by a noticeable increase in its 
volatility (the 12MMSE of the yty % change of the rates of growth) compared to that 
registered in the period 2002.01 – 2007.12. 
Therefore, the enormous expansion in the BOE total assets that began in September 2008 
was very erratic, did not maintain the pace of growth of M2 and increased the volatility of 
this broader monetary aggregate.  
Figure 8 
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c) QE in the Euro Zone 
The analysis of QE for the Euro Zone employs data from 1998.12 to 2014.12 for the 
European Central Bank (ECB) assets, and from 1980.01 -2014.12 for M2. Both series are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) database. 
Before the financial crisis, between 2000.01 and 2006.12, the balance sheet of the ECB 
exhibited a rather unstable behavior, growing frequently above 10% (yty), but also 
registering a period of marked and continuous contraction between September 2001 and 
January 2003 (Figure 9). July 2005 – December 2006, was a period of straight growth of the 
ECB assets above 10% (yty), with several observations higher than 15%. Then from 2007.01 
until 2007.08, ECB assets grew below 10%, and then accelerated again from 2007.09 to 
2008.09 to rates around 20% (yty). In October 2008, the ECB announced its first QE 
measure: to lend as much as banks wanted at a fixed-rate tender with an expanded list of 
collateral accepted (Fawley and Neely, 2013). This measure produced a jump in the yty rate 
of growth of the ECB assets to 60.78% in October 2008, 52.56% in November 2008, 37.61% 
in December 2008, 42.57% in January 2009, and 36.17% in February 2009. ECB assets 
continued growing close to 30% (yty) from 2009.03 to 2009.08. Additional impulse to the 
ECB assets came from new measures announced in May 2009, including asset purchases 
(Fawley and Neely, 2013). But in November 2009, December 2009 and January 2010, ECB 
total assets contracted. Growth resumed in February 2010, but generally below 10% with 
another short period of contraction (2011.04 – 2011.07).  This happened despite new 
measures announced by the ECB in May 2010.These measures, however, were mainly based 
on sterilized operations (Fawley and Neely, 2013). In October 2011, the ECB announced a 
second round of asset purchases and a new extension of credit facilities. These actions 
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stimulated a new period of rapid expansion of total ECB assets from 23.09% (yty) in October 
2011 to a peak of 57.3% (yty) in June 2012. Growth of ECB assets continued strong until 
November 2012. But from 2013.03 to 2014.12 the ECB assets contracted continuously and 
at double digit rates.   
Figure 9 
 
 
The previous account of the behavior of the ECB total assets is reflected clearly in the 
volatility indicator of this series (Figure 10). The 12-month moving standard errors of the yty 
rate of growth of the ECB assets were under the value of 6 between 2000.11and 2007.11. 
But after 2007.12, the 12MMSE frequently overshoot the value of 10, and in many occasions 
registered values above 15 and 20.  
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Figure 10 
 
 
As shown in Figure 11, M2 in the Euro Zone grew well above 5% on a yty basis since January 
2001 until August 2009. In fact, during the period 2007.07 – 2008.11, it grew most of the 
time above 10% (yty). But in September 2009, its rate of growth was 4% (yty), and from then 
on it started to reduce its pace to values under 2% (yty) during the period 2010.01 – 
2010.06. In July 2010, it returned to growth rates above 2%, but it never reached the 5% 
level again in the sample period that ends in 2014.12.  
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Figure 11 
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the volatility of the M2 series of Euro Zone increased substantially 
during the period of acute deceleration of its yty rate of growth. The 12MMSE of the yty 
rates of growth of M2 were below one from February 2002 until February 2009. In contrast, 
this volatility measure of the yty rate of growth of M2 was above 2 from 2009.09 until 
2010.03, and well above 1 from 2010.04 until 2010.07. In fact the maximum value of the 
12MMSE series (2.33) was reached in December 2009.  
Thus, in the Euro Zone, QE programs did not result in a contraction in the level of the broad 
aggregate M2, but the strong expansion and uneven behavior of the ECB total assets did not 
translate in a stabilization of its rate of growth around pre-crisis values, and a substantial 
increase of its volatility was observed during part of the implementation period. 
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Figure 12 
 
 
d) QE in Japan 
The case of Japan is very particular, because it economic woes are not entirely the product 
of the 2008 international financial crisis, but the legacy of its 1991 domestic financial crisis 
that up to date remains unresolved.  
The analysis of Japan’s QE programs is based on monthly average data of the monetary base 
from 1970.01 to 2014.12. This time series is obtained from the Bank of Japan database. The 
end of period series of the monetary base is only available since July 1996, and the Bank of 
Japan total assets starts in April 1998. Because we want to take account of the 1991 
financial crisis, these last two series are not adequate. 
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The M2 series extracted from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis FRED database covers the 
period 1967.01 – 2014.11. 
Greenwood (2006) points out that the attempt of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to coordinate 
policy internationally after 1985, and the abandonment of monetary targeting undermined 
the conduct of domestic monetary policy. In particular, Greenwood (2006) considers that 
the extended monetary easing from 1985 - 1989 was central to the strong increase in assets 
prices. The average monetary base rate of growth (yty) data (Figure 13) indicates November 
1986 as the point from which monetary policy turned more expansive relative to values 
observed since mid-1979.  This period of mostly double-digit growth ends in 1990.09. 
In order to reverse asset inflation, the BOJ started rising interest rates in May 1989 
(Greenwood, 1989). But the BOJ underestimated the impact on GDP growth and non-assets 
prices of its “bubble-busting” policy. The initial response to the deceleration of the Japanese 
economy was completely on the fiscal side (Greenwood, 2006).  From 1991 to 2001 the BOJ 
continued conducting monetary policy using the interest rate strategy in place before the 
financial crisis (1985),  lowering the official discount rate from 2.5% progressively to 0% in 
February 1999 (Greenwood, 2006).  In March 2001the BOJ officially abandoned its interest 
rate strategy and formally adopted a QE strategy (Greenwood, 2006).  
The average monetary base data (Figure 13) shows an increase in the yty rates of growth 
around August 2001 (9.03% yty), reaching a peak of 36.34% yty in April 2002. It kept 
growing above or close to 20% yty  until December 2002. Between 2003.01 – 2003.04 the 
monetary base slowed down to yty rates close to 10%, but picked up pace growing slightly 
above 20% during the period 2003.06 – 2003.10. From then on, it started to slow down 
rapidly, exhibiting straight negative values between 2006.03 and 2007.07. The average 
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monetary base continued growing yty under 10% until February 2011. From March 2011 to 
February 2012, the average monetary base grew mostly in the 10% - 20% range, with a peak 
value of 23.9% yty in April 2011.  A new stage of slow growth was observed in the period 
2012.03 – 2013.01. The first formal announcement of a QE program based on asset 
purchases as part of the economic plan of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was made on April 
2013. An extension of the program was announced in October 2014. From February 2013 
until 2014.12, the average monetary base exhibited a rapid pace, growing well above 30% 
yty. Until 2014.12, the peak yty value was 55.68% in February 2014.   
Figure 13 
 
 
As shown in Figure 14, after a period of relatively high volatility since the beginning of the 
70s until the early 80s, the 12-month moving standard error of the yty rate of growth of the 
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average monetary base was generally below 2 from 1983.03 to 1999.11. During the period 
of the financial crisis, between 1990.11 and 1993.08, there was a slight increase in the 
volatility indicator with values frequently above 2. But, in general, the financial crisis did not 
have a noticeable effect on the volatility of the monetary base. In contrast, the period 
around the application of the first QE program (March 2001), presents an evident increase 
in the 12MMSE of the rate of growth of the average monetary base. From 2000.01 until 
2005.01, the 12MMSE always registered values above 3, with a peak of 10.26 in April 2002.   
The period of strong deceleration of the monetary base, 2006.03 - 2007.07, also elevated 
substantially the volatility of the series. There is a new period of relative low volatility 
between 2008.04 – 2011.02, but in March 2011 this indicator started to climb again, 
reaching the highest value of the sample employed, 14.52 in November 2013, a few months 
after the beginning of prime Minister Abe’s expansionary program. Thus, as the experiences 
previously described in the US, the UK, and the Euro Zone, Japan’s QE operations have 
produced a substantial increase in the volatility of the monetary base. 
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Figure 14 
 
 
The evolution of the monthly values of M2 is presented in Figure 15. Before the 1991 
financial crisis, M2 grew vigorously. From 1967.01 until 1979.12, M2 rate of growth on a yty 
basis was generally above 11%. It slowed down to a range between 7% - 11% during the 
period 1980.01 – 1987.08. During the period 1987.09 – 1988.10, M2 growth rate yty kept 
hovering 11%. From 1988.11 to 1989.12 the yty rate of growth moved around 10%, and 
then again from 1990.01 to 1990.10, the yty rate registered values over 11%. But since the 
beginning of 1991, M2 started to grow at a much slower pace, presenting consecutive 
values under 1%, and six negative values yty, in the period 1992.06 – 1993.04.  Since 
February 1991 until November 2014, M2 only grew once, in February 1998, at 5% yty. 
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(2001.08 – 2002.12), the rate of growth yty of M2 was mostly above 3%. The 
implementation of the second QE program under Abe’s administration has produced a 
modest acceleration in the yty rate of growth of M2. The yty rate of growth of M2 from 
2013.02 until 2014.11 has been mostly above 3%, with some values higher than 4% between 
2013.10 and 2014.01.  
Figure 15 
 
 
Figure 16 displays the 12-month moving standard errors of the yty rate of growth of M2. 
The sharp fall in the rate of growth of M2 that started during the 1991 financial crisis, 
increased notably the volatility of the series, registering values above 2 between 1991.02 – 
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1992 until the end of the sample period (2014.11).  For most of this period, the values of the 
12MMSE of the yty rate of growth of M2 have been below 1. 
Hence, in the case of Japan, the QE1 (2001.08 – 2004.02) and the ongoing QE2 have 
produced strong and erratic expansions in the monetary base with little effects on the rate 
of growth of M2.  
Figure 16 
 
 
6.- Conclusion 
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crisis, but the specific way in which QE have been implemented by the Fed and other major 
central banks since the 2008 does not comply with Friedman’s basic principles. 
From a doctrinal point of view, QE can be traced back to Friedman’s works during the sixties 
and some comments on Japan’s situation after its 1991 financial crisis. Other monetarists 
such as Allan Meltzer have explained in detail how open market operations in long-term 
debt could make monetary policy effective in a zero interest rate environment. Support for 
QE cannot be found in the current dominant schools of thought in economics (New Classical 
and New Keynesian), that have minimized the role of monetary aggregates as a tool of 
economic policy.    
Friedman’s remarks on the necessity of an expansive monetary policy in Japan after the 
1991 financial crisis cannot be taken as an open support to any type of QE arrangement.  
The paper presents evidence that Friedman backing of QE programs during episodes of 
financial turmoil rests mainly on what he (and Anna Schwartz) called the “monetary” effects 
of monetary policy and the requirement that monetary policy actions should be an 
stabilizing force in the economy. A QE program consistent with Friedman’s tenets can be 
achieved through the use of outright open market operations to produce a significant 
(relative to “normal” times), and sustained increased in high power money capable of 
stabilizing the behavior of broader monetary aggregates such as M2.  
Though Nelson (2011) is a very serious and academically solid work, I consider that its 
attempt to connect Friedman’s views to QE through the monetarist portfolio balance theory 
is misguided. The monetarist portfolio balance theory centers on the capacity of monetary 
policy to affect the path of the long-run interest rate relative to the short-run interest rate, 
but this is not the main theme in Friedman’s argument in favor of QE operations. The 
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portfolio balance theory is neither necessary to establish a link between Friedman’s ideas on 
QE and the intensive use of open market operations in long-term securities in the 
implementation of the QE programs since 2008. In his discussions on the “bills only” 
doctrine, Friedman makes clear that open market operations in long-term government debt 
are a valid instrument to expand high-powered money in order to attain the “monetary” 
effects.          
From an empirical perspective, the paper examines the QE experiences in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, the European Union and Japan. In all these cases, the QE programs 
have been implemented through enormous jumps in the rate of growth of the monetary 
base/central bank’s assets that cannot be sustained for long and rapidly revert to low or 
negative rates. When a new round of QE is approved this cycle repeats again. This modus 
operandi translates into a huge increase in the volatility of the rate of growth of high-
powered money/central bank assets. Moreover, the QE programs have been ineffective in 
terms of maintaining the rate of growth of M2 at the levels observed in “normal” times, and 
in all cases, except for Japan, has raised the volatility of this monetary aggregate. From this 
analysis I conclude, that the type of QE programs put in practice by the Fed and other major 
central banks since the 2008 financial crisis (Japan since 2001), do not comply with 
Friedman’s views about the role of monetary policy during periods of financial distress. 
Fawley and Neely (2013) detailed analysis illustrates an important point that contributes to 
explain why QE programs implemented since the 2008 financial crisis were not able to 
sustain a stable rate of growth of the monetary base/central bank assets. The Fed and the 
BOE that operate in economies where bond markets are relatively more dominant, 
executed their QE programs mainly through bond purchases, but in many occasions, 
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especially the Fed, offset the effects of these purchases on the monetary base/central bank 
assets using different types of sterilization operations. On the other hand, the ECB and the 
BOJ that operate in economies that rely relatively more on banks, implemented their QE 
operations mainly through loans to the banking system, and also sterilized some of their 
asset purchases.  
Fawley and Neely (2013) also note another aspect of the QE programs of these four major 
central banks that separate them from Friedman’s principles: they were initially centered in 
reducing financial market distress, but they were soon deviated to a variety of purposes, 
including hitting inflation targets, stimulating the real economy, and containing the 
European sovereign crisis.  
Fawley and Neely (2013) corroborate an important empirical finding of this paper: that 
while the monetary expansion policies of all four central bank examined led to sharp 
increases in the monetary base, none led to sharp increases in broader monetary 
aggregates.     
From some of Friedman’s arguments previously reported, I think that he would have 
coincided with Taylor’s (2015) position that even during a period of financial instability, 
monetary policy should preserve, as much as possible, a rule-like predictability. 
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